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Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality and Revaluation of Values 
 




One of Nietzsche’s main projects was to critique morality and to invite a revaluation of our values. 
Neither secular nor religious interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique of morality do it justice. Each 
support their own interpretation by appealing to certain aspects of his writings. The former appeal 
to Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity and Christian morality; while the latter appeal to 
Nietzsche’s anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian remarks. In actuality, Nietzsche was neither of the 
two: he argued that Western secular moralities are a modern manifestation of Christian morality, 
and that Christian morality is a manifestation of what he comes to call “Slave Morality.” On this 
account, this thesis is a humble attempt to bring forth a philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
critique and historical analysis of morality, and how we can incorporate his critique and revaluation 
of values into our lives so we can live a better life. I hope that my contribution will be a meaningful 
addition to the ongoing philosophical discussion on Nietzsche. I also hope that this thesis will be 




Writing this thesis has been by far the most engaging task I have worked on since I began my 
undergraduate degree. I am thankful to my parents who encouraged me all throughout my time as 
a student at the University of Iowa. 
 
I am thankful beyond expressions to my advisor, Professor David Cunning, who has been a 
tremendous help in this project. Professor Cunning is an exemplar of what students appreciate in 
a teacher and a mentor. 
 
I am thankful to Professor Katarina Perovic, Professor Gregory Landini, Professor Ali Hasan, 
Professor Jovana Davidovic, Professor Carrie Swanson, and Professor Richard Fumerton. Without 
them, I would not have been a student of Philosophy. Being a student of Philosophy at the 
University of Iowa taught me useful and long-lasting skills; including the ability to read, analyze 
and engage with philosophical text. The ability to engage with philosophical text is a skill which I 
am, without a doubt, extremely grateful to have acquired.  
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One thing that any reader of Nietzsche identifies is his constant critique of morality all 
throughout his work. Brian Leiter, an American philosopher and a prominent scholar of Nietzsche, 
wrote that “Nietzsche’s overriding concern is what he comes to call the revaluation of values or 
the critique of morality.” 1  According to Nietzsche, the unchallenged cultural dominance of 
morality hinders the growth of the individual and of society in general. Some people become too 
dogmatic about their moral beliefs; they hold moral values that are passed down from their 
ancestors without necessarily questioning them. For this reason, Nietzsche declared his project of 
critiquing moral values:  
Let us speak out this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these 
values is for the first time to be called into question—and for this purpose a knowledge is 
necessary of the conditions and circumstances out of which these values grew, and under 
which they experienced their evolution and their distortion (morality as a result, as a 
symptom, as a mask, as tartuffism, as disease, as a misunderstanding; but also morality as 
a cause, as a remedy, as a stimulant, as a fetter, as a drug), especially as such a knowledge 
has neither existed up to the present time nor is even now generally desired . . . [What if] 
morality itself were to blame if man, as species, never reached his highest potential power 
and splendor? Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, Preface 6 
 
Much of Nietzsche’s work places great emphasis on the dynamics of overcoming in the sense of 
exceeding the constrictions and outer boundaries of our dominant patterns of living, perceiving, 
and especially valuing. Many of the values of our morality which have been passed to us from our 
ancestors have been taken by us as a given. Some of us, for example, place great significance on 
abstinence because our morality is influenced by the notion of “sin,” and the feelings of guilt and 
bad conscience; in turn we might place unhealthy restrictions on our ourselves—both physically 
and mentally—so that we do not become sinners. Other people live their lives under the belief that 
                                                        
1Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, Nietzsche’s project: the revaluation of values, pp. 26. 
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life is short, temporary, unworthy, and what we should be excited about is what comes in the 
afterlife; in turn they might sublimate their earthly impulses and natural instincts. 
Such sentiments are generally valued along with other ascetic values. There is nothing 
wrong with being ascetic per se2; it is only when asceticism is aimed at renouncing earthly 
pleasures and casting them as unworthy of our attention that it becomes subject to Nietzsche’s 
critique.3 Asceticism then – particularly that which is disguised as a religious virtue – belongs to 
Nietzsche’s project of reevaluating values. Moreover, asceticism becomes an issue in Nietzsche’s 
account not only when it is disguised as a religious virtue, but also when it goes against one’s will 
to power.4 While Nietzsche denounces Christianity, his critique is not necessarily a denunciation 
of the religion unconditionally. For instance, Nietzsche encourages us to criticize and be against 
Nazism unconditionally and regard it as a bad ideology regardless of when it occurred or where it 
occurred. In fact, Nietzsche is clearly against Anti-Semitism: in Beyond Good and Evil he proposes 
that we should “banish the anti-Semitic bawlers out of the country.”5 His critique of Christianity, 
however, is not unconditional; it is only against certain historical moments in which it occurred.6 
Nietzsche believes that when we leave our morality unexamined and accept values as a 
given, we may not be able to advance our lives and reach our highest splendor. Maudemarie Clark, 
“who has done the most to illuminate the evolution of Nietzsche’s philosophical views,” argued 
that “[Nietzsche’s] ultimate problem with morality [is not] that it does not give us good reasons 
but, … that it stands in the way of a kind of human perfection.”7 A Nietzschean solution would be 
                                                        
2 In The Will to Power Nietzsche approves of certain forms of asceticism; he writes “I also want to make asceticism 
natural again: … in the most spiritual real.” 915. 
3 In Genealogy of Morality III 8 Nietzsche describes how the ascetic ideal becomes an instrument for the priests to 
preach values such as poverty, humility and chastity. 
4 The Will to Power will be discussed at greater length in the first section. 
5 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, VII 251. 
6 In Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Nietzsche, Ken Gemes writes that Nietzsche’s assessment of Christianity “is not 
universal over time, nor indeed is it even universal over all people of a given time. At the particular historical point 
of time where Nietzsche finds himself, he sees certain notions as being threatening for certain types of individuals. 
7 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, what are “Genealogy” and the Genealogy, pp. 183. 
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to start by inviting a critique of our values and a revaluation of our moral system in order to create 
a better, healthier, and life-affirming system of morality. Through careful revaluation of our values, 
we can then replace the values which go against our instincts with healthy values that are based on 
human authority. 
In order to accomplish such a task, we must first revisit Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality. 
Nietzsche argued that Christian morality is a modern manifestation of “slave morality.” Slave 
morality is an ancient morality that developed as a reaction to “noble morality.” Nietzsche also 
argues that while the belief in the Christian God has been on the decline, it does not mean that the 
morality Christianity brought is no longer the dominant one: 
God ‘the Father’ has been thoroughly refuted…[yet] [i]t seems to me that the religious instinct is 
indeed growing vigorously—but that it rejects any specifically theistic gratification with profound 
distrust. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 53 
 
My goal in this thesis is to present a discussion on Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, a topic 
which is at the center of Nietzsche’s project of critiquing morality. Then, I discuss Nietzsche’s 
historical analysis of the development of what Nietzsche comes to call “slave morality” and 
“master morality.” Once I have laid out Nietzsche’s historical analysis of morality, I will argue 
that Christian morality is a modern manifestation of slave morality. In the same way, I will argue 
that some modern secular moralities, especially the one’s which are based on Utilitarianism, are 
still “Christian to the core.”8 It would be pleasant if one could create a Nietzschean formula on 
how we can reevaluate our own values without needing to revisit his historical analysis of morality. 
However, any attempt to do such thing without first examining the historical aspect of morality 
and how it relates to modern moralities is bound to misunderstand Nietzsche.  
                                                        
8 Brian Leiter, THE DEATH OF GOD AND THE DEATH OF MORALITY. 
 4 
The Will to Power 
 
Nietzsche frequently presents new concepts by ways of comparison to ideas of other 
philosophers. The first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil, for example, is titled “On the Prejudice 
of Philosophers.” With regards to the concept of the will to power, Nietzsche also frequently 
discusses it by comparing it to Schopenhauer’s notion of the will to life. Because of this, I decided 
to follow the same structure and present the will to power by comparing it and contrasting it with 
Schopenhauer’s notion of the will to life. 
Schopenhauer, who Nietzsche considered to be his great teacher9, considered that the main 
driving force in humans is what he comes to call the will to live. Life is suffering because life is a 
constant state of willing, according to Schopenhauer.10 Suffering can take different forms and it is 
not necessarily always followed by happiness; whereas happiness is only a temporary cessation of 
some particular suffering. Ultimately, “life … is short, fleeting, and uncertain … life is so full of 
troubles and vexations, that one must either rise above it by means of corrected thoughts, or leave 
it.”11 For Schopenhauer, all visible tangible phenomena are merely subjective,12 he even goes so 
far as to argue that we subjectively add space and time to the world, just like, for example, when 
we put on a Virtual Reality Headset – we do not interact with what we perceive through the headset 
directly. When we wear a VR headset, we add a layer of ‘visual reality’ to our experience: this is 
Schopenhauer’s notion of reality, a layer through which we indirectly experience the world. 
Consequently, for Schopenhauer, we are incapable of directly observing reality without a layer of 
experience which mediates between us and the world. That we cannot experience reality in a direct 
manner is originally a Kantian notion.13 For Schopenhauer, who was greatly influenced by Kant, 
                                                        
9 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, Preface 5. 
10 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol I, pp. 400. 
11 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol I, pp. 131. 
12 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol I, pp. 27. 
13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, pp. 41. 
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we can only experience through all visible tangible phenomena which, he claims, are merely 
subjective. According to him, a substantial part of our experience of the world is that of our 
languishing expression of will and how it filters onto all that we encounter. 
Kant believed that we can rationally base our moral decisions on something like a moral 
law: “Laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to 
happen—although perhaps it never does happen—therein differing from laws of nature, which 
relate only to that which happen. These laws are therefore to be entitled practical laws.”14 Through 
our capacity of reason, we can logically agree on a “Universal Law” – a moral principle binding 
on everyone, everywhere and all the time. Schopenhauer rejects this position by proposing that the 
universe is not a rational place and argues that the best way for us to live a moral life and to deal 
with the constant suffering is to be compassionate. Compassion, as opposed to reason, or God 
given commandments, is the real basis of morality. In fact, Schopenhauer believed that it would 
be better not to live at all since life itself consists of endless suffering through the pursuit of goals 
which only bring us temporary pleasure. But given the tragic reality that we are alive—and that 
the will is always going to be operative in a person’s struggle for existence and self-preservation—
we have a moral obligation not to make the suffering of life worse for ourselves and everyone else. 
This can be achieved by valuing compassion above all things; patience and tolerance towards other 
fellow-suffering beings. So, a Schopenhauerian approach to life would be to aim primarily at 
minimizing the suffering of life and to be compassionate towards other fellow suffering humans. 
This is where Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer’s notion of the will: namely drawing 
away from the unhealthy denial of life; and rejecting the notion that the will is ultimately aimed at 
self-preservation. The will for Nietzsche is “primitive form of affect, that all other affects are only 
                                                        
14 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, The Canon of Pure Reason, I pp. 634. 
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developments of it.”15 Contrary to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche came to view “questionable and 
terrifying things” as a “symptom of strength.”16  Both agree that there is a “will” that underlies all 
existence, but for Nietzsche, it is “not merely conservation of energy, but maximal economy in 
use, so the only reality is the will to grow stronger of every center of force—not self-
preservation.”17 While the will to power can manifest itself through violent behavior and physical 
domination over others, Nietzsche is more interested in the sublimated kind of will to power, where 
one can turn his will inwardly and aim at self-mastery instead of mastery over others. Additionally, 
an important feature of the will to power is that it does not strive for pleasure, “but pleasure 
supervenes when that which is being striven for is attained; pleasure is an accompaniment, pleasure 




Nietzsche’s notion of pleasure is related Schopenhauer’s notion, but different in some 
respects. For Schopenhauer, pleasure is that which we temporarily feel when we satisfy a desire 
that we have (i.e. satisfying hunger with food), whereas for Nietzsche, pleasure lies precisely “in 
the fact that the will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance.” In other words, 
pleasure is a side effect of the will to power. For example, when I run a marathon – a difficult and 
physically demanding activity – I am resisted by my physical limitation and mental desire to rest 
instead of continuing the marathon. But if I keep pushing, I feel pleasure every time I progress 
further towards the end of the marathon. I could choose to quit at any moment in order to end the 
displeasure caused by the shortness of breath and tiredness of muscles, but if I did, I would not 
                                                        
15 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 366. 
16 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 450. 




feel the amount of pleasure I would get if I kept going till the finish line. In this case, “one could 
perhaps describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of little unpleasurable stimuli.”19 In other words, 
the greater the discomfort one experiences, the more difficult the activity, the more pleasure one 
feels by resisting it. 
Displeasure therefore is not something which one should exclusively aim at minimizing; 
instead, one “is rather in continual need for it; every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event, 
presupposes a resistance overcome.”20 Therefore, for Nietzsche, pleasure is something which one 
gets when the will to power is striving against something that resists. The will to power is the 
ability to adapt discipline and responsibility and pursue goals which challenge oneself into 
becoming what one sees as a better version of oneself. Nietzsche writes,  
What is good? – Everything that enhances people’s feeling of power, will to power, power itself. 
What is bad? – Everything stemming from weakness. What is happiness? – The feeling that power 
is growing, that some resistance has been overcome. The Antichrist, Preface 2 
 
In this way, the will to power is about expression not about possession: that is, it is not about 
dominating and gaining power over other people. The will to power is the feeling one gets when 
“some resistance has been overcome.” When one is striving to satisfy one’s will to power, one is 
inadvertently bound to feel pleasure. On the other hand, “whenever the will to power falls off in 
any way, there will also be physical decline, decadence.”21 Whether a person has an aim in life or 
not, their will to power, according to Nietzsche, is innate – always operating. How one should 
utilize their will to power depends on one’s aim, meaning, or goal in life. 
 
Genealogy – The Creation of Master Morality 
 
                                                        
19 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 697. 
20 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 347. 
21 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, Preface 17. 
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Given that the will to power is the ultimate driving force in humans, Nietzsche provides 
the basis of how it has been exercised throughout history. Specifically, in The Genealogy of 
Morality he embarks in an in-depth analysis of the historical evolution of morality and explicitly 
calls for a critique and a revaluation of values: “We need a critique of moral values, the value of 
these values should itself, for once, be examined.”22 Precisely, Nietzsche invites this critique 
because as he notes, it “for once” needs to be undertaken23 and as a point of departure from 
Schopenhauer’s claim that compassion is the proper basis of morality.24 
In Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche describe how our system of values has gone through 
stages of transitions: ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ did not always refer to the same things they do now. Our 
contemporary understandings of morality developed from an earlier distinction between the “Good” 
and the “Bad,” rooted in aristocratic values. The two moralities Nietzsche describes are referred 
to as “Master Morality” and “Slave Morality”; sometimes he uses the two phrases interchangeably 
with “Noble Morality,” and “Herd Morality.” ‘Good’ in master morality was not a reference 
unegoistic acts of kindness. Instead, the aristocrats considered ‘the good’ to be a reference to “the 
noble, the mighty, the high-placed and high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their 
actions as good”; whereas ‘bad’ in master morality was a reference to the “lowly, low-minded, 
common and plebian.” 25 The masters’ way of valuing did not depend on whether something is 
useful; instead, whatever elevated them, whatever increased their wealth, strength, nobility, etc. 
was valued by them.  Contrarily, the slaves were passive and reactive. 
 The characteristics of both the masters and the slaves, to a certain extent, are influenced 
by their parents and ancestors: “It is quite impossible for a man not to have the qualities and 
                                                        
22 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, Preface 6. 
23 For reasons which I shall discuss later in this essay after I lay out Nietzsche’s historical take on morality. 
24 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, Preface 5. 
25 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, I 2. 
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predilections of his parents and ancestors in his constitution.” 26  Additionally, the masters 
constituted a minority whereas the slaves were the majority.27 In turn, the definitions the slaves 
ascribe to words such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were more popular and used more often among society 
members. Take for instance the development of language: Nietzsche believes that it developed as 
a means to express what individuals share in common and to be able to understand one another. 
For instance, in the Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche provides a historical analysis of language 
used by slave morality where for instance, the word ‘poor’ became synonymous with ‘saint’ and 
‘friend.’28 Moreover, in the introduction of Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche traces the roots of 
the word ‘truthful,’ one of the terms the masters use to refer to themselves: “For example, [the 
masters] call themselves ‘the truthful’: led by the Greek aristocracy … The word used specifically 
for this purpose, αλήθεια, means, according to its root, one who is, who has reality, who really 
exists and is true.” Here, Nietzsche the philologist29 is arguing how the masters viewed ‘truth’ not 
as knowledge that can be discovered or attained (for instance, truth about the metaphysical world); 
instead, it was “assimilated with the sense of ‘aristocratic’, in contrast to the deceitful common 
man.” Even truth for the masters was related to the aristocratic way of living since they are 
primarily concerned with what elevates them.30 
Masters, essentially a reference to the aristocratic noble society, are the beings that elevate 
man in Nietzsche’s account: “Every elevation of the type ‘man,’ has hitherto been the work of an 
aristocratic society.”31  In the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche states that masters are value 
creators based on their own authority and criterion: “The noble type of man feels himself to be the 
                                                        
26 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IX 264. 
27 This is an empirical claim that in every society, the aristocrats are always a minority. 
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, V 195. 
29 Nietzsche is also a classical philologist, which is another reason why he’s interested in looking at problems from a 
historical perspective. 
30 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, I 5. 
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IX 257. 
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determiner of values, he does not need to find approval, in his opinion, ‘What harms me is harmful 
as such’, he knows that he himself is the one to first confer honor on a thing, he creates values.”32 
In its essence, master morality is recognizing that one can measure the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ on her 
own. Driven by the will to power, a master is one who expresses and actualize his desires to 
overcome whatever is resisting him to be a noble person. According to Nietzsche, subscribers to 
master morality are beings who do not answer to anyone. Since they do not answer to anyone, 
whatever they want to happen does happen. In other words, they assert themselves and dictate 
what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ based on their evaluation of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ The will to power 
in the masters can be practiced without interference from those who are outside of the particular 
class of masters. However, as it is observable in most societies, the aristocrats are always a small 
group of people (i.e., the minority). Masters, given that they are solitary and independent, are 
creator of their own values: “… it is the peculiar right of masters to create values.”33 In master 
morality, the concept of ‘good,’ as I noted in the beginning of this section, was not introduced as 
a label for unselfish acts (i.e. un-egotistical acts), but rather as a label which distinguishes the noble 
from the ones whom the nobles considered inferior. It is later that ‘good’ developed into un-
egotistical acts of kindness. And similarly, ‘bad’ was a reference to the distinguishing feature of 
the lower common class (i.e. the slaves). 
 
Genealogy – The Creation of Slave Morality 
 
Slave morality is a reaction to master morality. Essentially, the slaves are subordinates of 
the oppressive masters. In the first essay of The Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche illustrates how 
persists played a role in the dynamics of the two moralities. Priests, according to Nietzsche, lack 
                                                        
32 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, 260. 
33 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IX 261. 
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the characteristics of the nobles: they are not as powerful, not as strong, but they are more 
intelligent, and they revolted against master morality.34 Out of their powerlessness, “their hate sells 
into something huge and uncanny to a most intellectual poisonous level.”35 The slaves and the 
priests, due to their lack of power, and out of ressentiment,36 began inverting the values of the 
nobles. In turn, the ‘good’—which in master morality was a reference to distinguish the noble from 
the ones whom the nobles considered inferior—became a reference to the suffering, the deprived, 
the sick, the ugly – those were “the only pious people … salvation is for them alone.” 
What comes out of the ressentiment of the slaves and the priests is a different form of 
valuation, one which operates against the master’s form of valuation. Due to and by virtue of the 
slaves’ weakness and oppression, they are unable to live their life in an affirmative way: they are 
unable to assert themselves and dictate what they take to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on their own 
evaluation – there needs to be someone whom they compare themselves to in order to judge 
themselves as ‘good.’ The ressentiment of the slaves turned creative enough so it developed a 
negative and reactive sentiment against the masters and their way of living. The slaves’ unpleasant 
reactive attitude to the masters is brought about by a frustration and inability to handle the suffering, 
and to externalize their suffering, thereby attributing it to the masters. Essentially, the slaves’ revolt 
in morality serves as a means to cope with the suffering, to view themselves as ‘good,’ and as a 
way to invert the values of the masters since the slaves lack the characteristics of the masters. This 
is similar to Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion since slave morality, according to Nietzsche, 
is motivated by the need to cope with suffering, which is a result of the slaves’ weakness and their 
                                                        
34 Section 195 of Beyond Good and Evil is Nietzsche’s first discussion of the slave revolt in morality. 
35 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, I 7. 
36 In Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality, Brian Leiter defines ressentiment a “feeling that 
arises in response or as a reaction to some state of affairs … It must be a state of affairs that is both unpleasant to 
the affected person and one which he is powerless to alter through physical action.”  
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will to power being regularly thwarted. Due to the slaves’ weakness and need to cope with the 
suffering, they aim at establishing a sense of community where “the individual’s dissatisfaction 
with himself is overridden by his delight at the prosperity of the community.”37 In its essence, 
“herd organization [is] the awakening of the communal feeling of power” which is in accordance 
with Nietzsche’s account that the will to power “is the primitive form of affect [which] all other 
affects are only developments of it.”38  
As a result, ‘good’ from the slave perspective referred to their characteristics and ways of 
living. Poverty, humbleness, weakness, forgiveness, neighborly-love and “turning the other cheek” 
were some of the ‘good’ values in slave morality. In addition, in slave morality the slaves benefited 
from the unegoistic actions of one another, such as turning the other cheek, so they referred to the 
actions which bring benefit to one another as ‘good.’ As a result, usefulness, helpfulness, and 
‘goodness’ were considered the same thing in slave morality: “unegoistic acts were praised and 
called good by their recipients, in other words, by the people whom they were useful; later, 
everyone forgot the origin of the praise and because such acts had always been habitually praised 
as good, people also began to experience them as good – as if they were something good as such.”39 
Nietzsche notes that we have forgotten such association, therefore ultimately considering 
usefulness as identical to ‘goodness.’ Over time, the convention of mixing up the two has led the 
slaves to consider themselves to be good by virtue of being a slave since a slave is forgiving, 
humble, and weak and the slaves consider these characteristics to be ‘good.’40 
Having self-control is another characteristic which the slaves praise in slave morality: 
slaves do not assert themselves and cannot live the way the masters do, so self-control becomes an 
                                                        
37 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, III 9. 
38 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 366. 
39 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, I 2. 
40 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, V 190. 
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important element for the slaves – it operates not necessarily for the sake of discipline, but more 
as a necessary mean to survival. Since the masters are the aristocratic class, they had more control 
in society, so when the slaves act in a way that dissatisfies the masters, the slaves are putting 
themselves in a dangerous position – so it was better for the slaves to have self-control, to be 
careful about how much they can discharge their natural impulses. Slave morality is concerned 
with how to live in a way that would create the least problems for the slaves since they are 
incapable of confronting or competing with the masters. In general, asserting oneself is not valued 
highly because such behavior could lead the slave into trouble. The master is viewed by the slave 
as someone who lacks traits such as self-control, abstinence, cleverness, deviousness, who have 
not learned to internally disrespect what externally they might go along with. 
The slaves suffer from a society which they come to view as oppressive and unequal. They 
are envious of those who lead a life that is less painful. They are frustrated with not being able to 
do anything about the suffering. As a mechanism of coping, the slaves revolted against master 
morality by creating new values, a new way of valuing, and making moral claims where weakness 
is virtue and strength is vice. The revolt in morality specifically “occurs when ressentiment itself 
turns creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the proper 
response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge.” More importantly, the slave 
does not value anything by internally judging whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’; instead, as a “feature 
of ressentiment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external 
world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, – its action is 
basically a reaction.”41 
 
                                                        
41 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, I 10. 
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Genealogy – Turning Bad into Evil 
 
Nietzsche argues that the slaves’ resentment, envy, and hatred of the masters eventually 
becomes strong enough to give ‘good’ and ‘bad’ a whole new meaning: ‘bad’ turns into ‘evil’ and 
becomes a reference to the masters who are stronger (both mentally and physically) and more 
capable of exercising their will to power with no fear of external circumstances. The difference 
between ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ in Nietzsche’s discussion of the two moralities is essentially that ‘bad,’ 
in master morality, is a reference to that which is weak, lowly, poor and un-noble; whereas ‘evil’ 
in master morality is not a way of valuing: the masters’ way of valuing did not involve the 
judgement that something is ‘evil’, but only either ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ The binary value judgement 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ are the master’s way of valuing, it is a characterization of morality by valuing 
and celebrating aristocratic values such as power and nobility being ‘good’ and weakness and 
ignobility being ‘bad.’ When the slaves revolted against the masters’ form of valuation, a new 
form of valuation came about: unlike the masters who judge things to either be ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ 
the slaves judge things to be either ‘good’ or ‘evil.’ In the masters’ way of valuing, a master is 
judged as being ‘good’ because he is noble, an action is judged as being ‘good’ because it expresses 
the master’s power; whereas in the slaves’ way of valuing (after the slave revolt), a slave is judged 
as being ‘good’ because he is not like the oppressive and ‘evil’ master. In slave morality, an action 
is judged as being ‘good’ because it relates to the slave’s way of living (e.g., being humble and 
forgiving is ‘good’). Nietzsche illustrates this notion in the first essay of the Genealogy of Morality, 
he writes: “In contrast [to the masters], picture ‘the enemy’ as the man of ressentiment conceives 
him…’the Evil One,’ and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves as an 
afterthought and pendant, a ‘good one’ -- himself!”42 Moreover, Nietzsche argues that an ‘evil’ act 
is an act that is ‘bad’ and that is seen, by the slaves, as having been done freely, where there can 
                                                        
42 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, I 10. 
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be blame and punishment against the perpetrator (i.e., the master). Consequently, slave morality 
devalued that which the master values and the slave does not have. For instance, the master is 
strong and wealthy, so the slave vilified the oppressor and devalued strength and wealth. This is 
an entirely opposite way of valuing from the masters’ way. The masters see themselves as ‘good’ 
without question, therefore, they come to view whatever is not them as ‘bad’, not ‘evil.’ ‘Good’ 
and ‘evil,’ as Nietzsche notes, is the position of the slaves, where ‘evil’ is that which the master 
does freely which is worthy of blame and punishment. The slaves’ way of deciding that an action 
is ‘evil’ is dependent on their belief that the action was done freely and that it is worthy of 
punishment. 
Christianity, Nietzsche argues, is in its essence slave morality – that is why he argues that 
priests plaid an important role in slave morality. Various verses in the Bible offer supporting 
examples to Nietzsche’s account on how the slave’s way of evaluating what is good is dependent 
on appealing to what the master does. For instance, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye 
of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God." (Mark 10:25) In other 
words, wealth, something which the masters possess, is not something good or something that 
should be desired.43 Further, what the slave does is also tied to a promise from God: “Blessed are 
the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.” (Matthew 5:5) This praising of values that belong to 
slave morality strengthened the slave’s opinion of their place in society. Now ‘our’ morality is not 
only ‘good’ because it contradicts the ‘evil’ masters, but it is also legitimate because it is supported 
by God – its authority is a Divine God. In this way, the slaves’ beliefs and moralities become 
dependent on what the priest preaches, and the preacher claims a connection to God and what he 
dictates to be ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ Thus, the slaves’ morality and way of valuing is motivated by the 
                                                        
43 Other interpretation of this verse claim that it is harder for the rich to enter ‘the kingdom of God,’ because 1) the 
rich has to justify how they acquired their wealth (i.e. ethical acquisition of wealth), and 2) justify where their 
money was spent – whether it was spent on things which cause suffering to others for example. 
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fact that there is a Divine being – He is the dictator of morality. Essentially, the externalization of 
the authority of morality—specifically to the Christian God—played an extremely significant role 
in shaping slave morality. 
There are two important claims which need to be justify. First, my claim that the slaves 
needed to externalize the authority of their morality. Second, my claim that specifically the 
Christian God played an important role in slave morality. The simple answer to both is to say given 
that slaves’ morality was a reaction to master morality and given that the slaves are incapable of 
asserting themselves in the world, they needed a way to express their power. So, given that 
Nietzsche is specifically discussing the slaves who were located close (distance wise) to where 
Christianity was birthed, Christianity and the Christian God were the best available option for the 
slaves to express their power and to feel a sense of support: “[Christianity ] offered innumerable 
people some support.” While this claim is supported by Nietzsche,44 it does not provide sufficient 
evidence to my claim that the slaves specifically needed the Christian God as an authority, for the 
slaves could have created their own morality of ressentiment, or they could have adapted a different 
religion such as Buddhism for example. To regard my claim as a reasonable explanation, I will 
provide two reasons of why the slaves needed the Christian God in specific as an authority. 
First, Buddhism is not compatible with the slaves’ generalized notion that there is a Divine 
commander whose commands and whose moral order everyone must follow unconditionally:  
What does ‘moral world order’ mean? That there is a will of God – once and for all – relating to 
what human beings do and do not do; that the value of people, of an individual, can be measured 
by how much or how little each one obeys the will of God … which is to say it punishes and rewards 
depending on the degree of obedience. The Antichrist, 26 
 
In this ‘moral world order’, there is no expectation on the slave to decide whether an action is 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ for himself, to be assertive, or be like the masters who do not fear confrontation; 
                                                        
44 See Genealogy of Morality, I 16, Beyond Good and Evil, III 48, The Antichrist, 58. 
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instead, the “do and do not do” are provided by God, all that the slave needs to do is obey God, 
and the more he obeys, the more ‘worthy’ he becomes.45 Moreover, given that a slave is not 
capable of asserting himself, of standing up to the noble, the slave had to look for a source of 
power somewhere else: “One sets up the opponent of one’s ideal as the opponent of God; one 
fabricates for oneself the right to great pathos, to power, to curse and bless.”46 So, for instance, 
instead for the slave to confront the oppressive master, the slave characterized the tension between 
himself and the master as being a tension between the ‘disobedient’ master and the almighty God, 
and whoever disobeys God is ‘evil’. It would not have been compatible for the slaves to be ‘on the 
side of God’ had they adapted Buddhism since Buddhism does not promise a powerful God on the 
side of the oppressed (i.e., the slave). Nietzsche explicitly states that when one lacks power and is 
unable to stand up and “gain authority over those who possess physical strength and authority,” 
one invokes “the belief that they have in their hands a higher, mightier strength—God.” 47 In this 
way, the belief in a powerful God fills the lack of power on the part of the slaves. 
Second, externalizing the source of morality to God was essential in bringing tremendous 
utility to the priests whom the slaves depended on; it operated as an instrument of power and 
control in the hands of the priest. This is expressed most clearly and explicitly in section 26 of The 
Antichrist: 
The priest -, abuses the name of God: he gives the name 'kingdom of God' to a state of affairs where 
the priests determine the value of things; he gives the name 'will of God' to the means used to reach 
or maintain this state; he … measures peoples, ages, and individuals according to whether they 
promote or oppose the domination of the priests … the priests simplified the psychology of every 
great event into the idiotic formula 'obedience or disobedience to God'. - Advancing to the next 
stage: the 'will of God', which is to say: the conditions for maintaining power in the hands of the 
priests, needs to be divulged, - this call for a 'revelation'. In simple terms: an enormous literary 
falsification is needed. The Antichrist, I 26 
 
                                                        
45 Similar notion is provided in The Will to Power, pp. 510. 
46 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 204. 
47 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 89. 
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It operated as a political tool in the hands of the priests in order to control the masses. In order to 
be ‘good,’ in slave morality, one has to obey God; and in order to obey God, one has to know what 
God wants through the priestly channel. It was the priest’s objective “to have it understood that he 
counts as the highest type of man,” not only that, but also “that he rules—even over those who 
wield power.” More importantly, the priest wanted it to be understood “that he is indispensable, 
unassailable” to the point that he “absolutely not to be replaced or undervalued.”48 The priests 
were able to reach the position of being important in slave morality by convincing the herd that 
“there is no other source of the good than the priests,” and “that there is no other, no direct access 
to God.”49 One of the significant consequences that resulted from the priests holding a powerful 
position in slave morality is that truth became “identical with the teachings of the priests.”50 
Ultimately, Nietzsche does not criticize slave morality because those who subscribe to it 
do not possess characteristics such as self-assertion. Instead, he criticizes it because it aims at 
devaluing and suppressing our natural instincts (i.e., it is better to be humble, weak, and poor than 
proud, strong, and rich); and because those who do not assert themselves and are in a position of 
weakness are bound to develop ressentiment towards those who are able to freely assert themselves. 
Therefore, Nietzsche sees slave morality as a way of life which is geared to a lack of perturbance, 
a way of easily getting through, a way to avoid any kind of confrontation or assertive negotiation 
that would require challenging the masters, a way of satisfying a sense of self-esteem without any 
external challenging, and most importantly, a way for the slaves to express their power since they 
believe they are on the side of a powerful God. 
 
                                                        
48 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 88. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 91. 
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Free Will – Doer vs Deed 
 
Much of these negative and life-negating characteristics that slave morality poses are, to 
some extent, a result of a false understanding of the relation between the doer and the deed. This 
misunderstanding is another factor that helped the slaves to view masters as ‘evil’ for the slaves 
believe that the masters could (meaning they had a choice to) act in a different way. Nietzsche 
writes that “there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; ‘the doer’ is 
invented as an afterthought, — the doing is everything.”51 He invites us to think of slave and master 
morality by reference to lambs and birds of prey. The lambs may resent a bird of prey for hunting 
and killing and judge them to be ‘evil.’ However, such judgement according to Nietzsche is 
meaningless because lambs do not avoid killing by virtue of a moral standard, instead they are 
simply unable to kill. If we judge the bird of prey for killing, it is a result of our thinking that the 
doer is separated from the deed, that the bird of prey has the ability to control its impulse to hunt 
and kill. But for Nietzsche, such thinking is a linguistic error since there is no such thing as a doer, 
only deeds. Nietzsche is not implying that violent people should be left to their own devices; 
instead, it is that the slaves in slave morality are deceiving themselves into believing that they are, 
in fact, capable of acting the way the masters do, but are refraining from doing so because they are 
‘good’ people: “‘Let us be different from evil people, let us be good! And a good person is anyone 
who does not harm anyone’ … this means, if heard coolly and impartially, nothing more than: ‘We 
weak people are just weak; it is good to do nothing for which we are not strong enough’”52 
For Nietzsche, different people have varying levels of strength, intellect, passion, 
endurance, etc. The issue is when people attempt to generalize a moral standard and assume that 
what works for them ought to work for everyone else. Both the weak and the strong (i.e., master 
                                                        
51 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, I 13 
52 Ibid. 
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and slave) are driven by the will to power, so the desire to be strong in natural in both of them. 
Since the weak are also driven by the will to power, but they are not strong enough to actualize 
their will to power, they accommodate for the inability to express their will to power by believing 
that their lack of strength is a free choice instead of something to which they are doomed. So, the 
ones who are lacking characteristics such as strength cast a moral judgement on the strong. It is a 
self-deceptive way for the weak to view himself as better than the ‘tyrannical’ strong. This 
essentially is Nietzsche’s problem with the concept of doer and deed, particularly with slave 
morality since it detaches the subject from the predicate. The subject becomes one’s “soul” which 
in turn becomes subject to moral judgement. 
This account of agency which separates the doer from the deed is one which Nietzsche saw 
as a dogmatic account, one which was taken for granted as the “right answer.”53 Given his strong 
skepticism of all dogmatic beliefs, Nietzsche here is opposed to taking the doer-deed account to 
be some kind of a “final answer.” One way to attack dogmatic accounts of agency is through 
critique, another way is to provide a strong alternative account. But Nietzsche’s ‘alternative 
account’ is not an attempt to replace one dogma with another, nor is it an attempt to fully explain 
the notion agency. In fact, he invites further critique and inquiry into his notion of agency: “the 
way is open for new versions and refinement of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as 
‘mortal soul,’ and ‘soul subjective multiplicity,’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and 
affects,’ which henceforth to have citizens’ rights in science.”54 Nietzsche saw the doer and deed 
                                                        
53 Even in our present day, this is still a common account of agency. Peter Singer for instance argues that 
“Becoming a vegetarian is a highly practical and effective step one can take toward ending both the killing of 
nonhuman animals and the infliction of suffering upon them.” Brian Leiter argues that the “basic moral outlook” 
of Peter Singer “is Christian to its core, as any Nietzschean would notice.” (THE DEATH OF GOD AND THE DEATH OF 
MORALITY, pp. 1). 
54 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, I 12. 
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notion of agency as an account which the weak defended very strongly.55 The belief that the strong 
had a choice, and is therefore worthy of blame and punishment, Nietzsche argues, is what 
“engenders hatred, revengefulness, deceitfulness … while we are far less censorious towards an 
animal because we regard it as unaccountable.”56 After all, subscribers of slave morality are still 
people, which means they have a will to power from the Nietzschean perspective, so this can be 
thought of as an outlet where the weak deceive themselves into believing that exercising strength 
is a free choice. 
 
On the Side of a Punishing God 
 
In the previous sections, I discussed the notion of God primarily to support my claim that 
He was necessary in slave morality, and that it is specifically the Christian God that was necessary. 
In this section, I will focus on Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of the role of God as a ‘Punisher’ 
on the side of the slaves. 
Nietzsche argues that the resentful slave does not discharge what frustrates him outwardly, 
he allows it to build inside him; what is done against him slowly builds as resentful hatred. He 
contemplates revenge, not by himself against his ‘enemy,’ but instead from the all-powerful God 
– a powerful being on his side. Neil Sinhababu argues that due to the slave’s unsatisfied desire, 
and “out of the brewing cauldron of unstained hate,”57 they have come to wish for revenge (through 
their “vengeful thinking”) against their masters.58 This way of thinking “allow the slaves to regard 
themselves as fully justified in hating the nobles, as one is justified in hating evil people.” It also 
                                                        
55 Weakness in this context is not necessarily physical weakness, but rather weakness of “spirit” as the word spirit 
is commonly used. 
56 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, Supplementary material, I 99. 
57 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, I 11. 
58 Sinhababu, Oxford Nietzsche and Morality, Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology, pp. 264. 
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“plays a key role in explaining why the afterlife will be pleasant for them and terrible for the 
nobles.”59 
The concept of the afterlife, particularly when the Judgement Day arrives, is described in 
an extremely graphical and vivid way by Tertullian in the fifteenth section of the first essay in The 
Genealogy of Morality: “persecutors of the name of the Lord, being liquified by flames fiercer 
than those with which they themselves regard against Christians.”60 It is not only vengeful thinking 
by the slave for revenge, but also, as described by Tertullian, a desire to watch, observe, and enjoy 
the suffering of their enemies. This kind of obsession for painful revenge is rooted deeply in slave 
morality: even in the afterlife when they are in heaven, they still hold a desire to watch their 
enemies burn in hell. Primarily, the seeking of revenge in slave morality, while desired by the 
slaves, is not expressed explicitly as a personal hope, but rather as the “Judgement of God” that 
will restore justice. It is not far from reasonable that extreme vengeful thinking could lead someone 
to have such conception of the afterlife. And it is not the case that all Christians have the same 
conception of the afterlife as Tertullian. However, as Sinhababu notes, this is “a powerful 
illustration of how vengeful our wishful thinking can lead one into error.”61 This way of thinking 
and conceiving the positive and negative aspects of life, as well as the importance of revengeful 
justice in slave morality, have allowed the slaves to not only believe that the masters are ‘evil’ and 
therefore by contrast the slaves are ‘good,’ but also to believe that the properties of ‘good’ and 
‘evil’ exist in the world.62 In modern terms, the slaves’ account is what ethicists have come to call 
“moral realism”: believing that there are “objective” facts about what is ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ and what 
                                                        
59 Sinhababu, Oxford Nietzsche and Morality, Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology, pp. 265. 
60 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, I 15. Section 15 of the first essay in Genealogy of Morality has a long dark and 
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when Judgement Day arrives. 
61 Sinhababu, Oxford Nietzsche and Morality, Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology, pp. 265. 
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is valuable and invaluable.63 A key issue in the discussion of the many accounts of metaethics—
including moral realism and anti-realism—is the necessity of providing a foundation for moral 
beliefs, a solid foundation that makes the moral claims true in a clear way.64 Therefore, it is 
important to understand Nietzsche’s position with regards to claims about the objectivity of values. 
 
God based Morality – Nietzsche’s account 
 
It is not uncommon for some people to think that God is the ultimate source of morality 
and that if God does not exist, then there is no such thing as right or wrong. A person might say: 
“If God does not exist, then everything is permitted.”65 One way to interpret this is to say that if 
God does not exist, then all normative beliefs become equal. The belief that anything that God 
says is more important and worthier of our attention than other beliefs will no longer be uniquely 
valuable once we no longer believe in God (either through the decline of faith or through fully 
abandoning religion). In other words, the Christian belief that has oriented many societies for 
thousands of years will no longer be significant. It will be just as valuable as any other belief. 
Often, as it has been noted by Nietzsche scholars, atheists attempt to utilize Nietzsche’s 
writing by arguing that he is an atheist and that his primary goal, stemming from the fact that he 
is an ‘atheist,’ is to eliminate religion. Hypothetically, if Nietzsche was motivated from an atheistic 
point of view, he would not have praised the Greek Gods for example. For him, the Greek Gods 
played a positive role in culture. The Christians “who saw in suffering a whole, hidden machinery 
of salvation” were “obliged to invent gods and intermediate beings at every level, in short, 
                                                        
63 Leiter, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality, Metaethics: realism about value? pp. 137. 
Nietzsche also argues how it was important for the priests to have the slaves believe that “truth exists,” but “there 
is only one way of attaining it: to become a priest.” The Will to Power, pp. 88. 
64 This is what is often referred to as the grounding problem in metaethics. 
65 Often this quote is attributed to Fyodor Dostoyevsky supposedly written in The Brothers Karamazov, but I could 
not find any evidence to such claim in the book. 
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something that … could see in the dark and which would not miss out on an interesting spectacle 
of pain so easily.” As a result of the invention of God by Christians, they came to view life as 
meaningful, as justifying itself and justifying its ‘evil’: “[Christianity] served the advocates of God 
insofar as it conceded to the world, in spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection—
including “freedom”: evil appeared full of meaning.”66 The Gods the Greeks invented played an 
entirely different role than the God of Christianity: “We can be in no doubt: they were intended to 
be festivals.”67  
However, it is one thing to question the existence of God; and it is another thing to assert 
that all morals, all values, are dependent on God. Nietzsche is not interested in providing an 
argument against the existence of God. When critiquing Christian morality, Nietzsche’s writings 
focus on the ideal that Christianity portraits—whether the ideal is life-affirming or life-denying 
for example: “The whole absurd residue of Christian fable, … and theology does not concern us. 
It could be a thousand times more absurd and we would not lift a finger against it. But we do 
combat the ideal.”68 Instead, he is more interested69 in psychologically evaluating the effects of  
the belief that either God is the source of morality, or that morality is independent from God. In 
fact, for Nietzsche truth and falsity of any religion are not the issue: “If someone were to prove 
this Christian God to us, we would believe in him even less.”70 Here, it does not make a difference 
for Nietzsche if the Christian God does actually exist. What matters for him is the values, the way 
of life, the approach to life that Judeo-Christian morality encourages. 
                                                        
66 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 10. 
67 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, II 7. 
68 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 252. 
69 Nietzsche is not against the idea of a God or Gods as a whole. He greatly admires the Greek Gods – Dionysian for 
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70 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, I 47. 
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Nietzsche critiques and rejects God-based morality (specifically Christian morality) not 
merely because it claims that its source is Divine, but because of its tendency towards 
unconditional generalization.71 For instance, Nietzsche also criticizes utilitarianism for reasons 
that are similar to his criticism of slave morality,72 namely the utilitarians insistence that a single 
set of moral principles is universally applicable. While it can be argued that utilitarianism is a 
secular moral theory, there can be no doubt that it is an offspring of Judeo-Christian values. John 
Stuart Mill, a classical utilitarian, explicitly promotes utilitarianism from a Christian point of view: 
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as 
one would done by, and to love one’s neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of 
utilitarian morality. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, II What Utilitarianism Is 
 
What might work for one person might not work for another: “That which serves the higher class 
of men for nourishment or refreshment, must also poison to an entirely different and lower order 
of human beings. The virtue of the common man would perhaps mean vice and weakness in a 
philosopher.”73 As Ken Gemes notes, it is this tendency towards unconditional generalization, 
“towards the notion that what is good for one is good for all, that Nietzsche identifies as the heart 
of all moralities.”74 In turn, for Nietzsche, the unchallenged belief that a unifying single morality 
works for everyone, all individuals and all groups, becomes a threat on human greatness and 
human excellence.75 
In Nietzsche’s discussion of the two moralities, we often find that slave/Christian morality 
always tries to generalize itself unconditionally; it claims that it is applicable to everyone. This 
claim is fundamentally based on the idea that because it is the God given morality, it must be the 
right one and so it must work for everyone. The values it provides are claimed to be universally 
                                                        
71 “What is fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good 
and Evil, VII 228 
72 Nietzsche also writes that “slave morality is essentially a morality of utility.” Beyond Good and Evil, IX 260 
73 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, II 30. 
74 Gemes, Nietzsche, Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth, 5. 
75 Leiter, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality, Nietzsche’s Project: The Revaluation of Values. 
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good because they are coming from a divine God. As a result of such claims, some people have 
come to the belief that we all ought to adhere to and follow such morality. This claim however, in 
the context of slave morality, is two claims fused together. 
It is an implicit claim that God does exist, and a claim that His morality is objective. Each 
of the two claims can be treated separately, but I will only argue on the second claim given the 
scope of this paper. As it has been stated earlier in this section, Nietzsche’s concern is not about 
the existence of God; instead, what concerns him (apart from the psychological effects) is the claim 
that it is an objective morality and because of that, all that comes out of it, all the values that it 
encapsulates, must not only be good for us, but also morally obligatory for us to follow. The claim 
that it is (or that there is) an objective morality presupposes that its values are (1) intrinsically 
valuable, (2) and that there are objective moral facts.  In the next two sections, I will argue 
Nietzsche’s position against the claim that moral values are intrinsically valuable, and the claim 
that there are objective moral facts. 
 
Intrinsic Value – Euthyphro’s Dilemma 
 
In Euthyphro by Plato, Socrates engages in a dialogue with Euthyphro, an Athenian judge, 
in an attempt to demonstrate that Euthyphro’s account of morality and the nature of goodness is 
not firmly grounded. In particular, Socrates’ question to Euthyphro where he asks, do good things 
have the quality of goodness because God loves them, or do they possess the quality of goodness 
independent from God (i.e., intrinsically)? Another way to view the question is to ask whether an 
action, for instance, is morally good because God says it is so, or that God recognizes that it is 
morally good because the action possesses the quality of goodness independent from Him. The 
relevant segment of the dialogues is the following: 
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Socrates: We shall soon know better whether it is. Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the 
gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods? (10d)76 
 
For Socrates, goodness and morality are not dependent on the existence of God. Goodness 
is a quality that a thing possesses intrinsically. When God does something good, it is not because 
God had decided that the thing is good; instead, God is acting in a way that meets the standards of 
morality and goodness, which already exist independently from Him. There is a worry here with 
Socrates’ account: if good and bad are entirely dependent on God, without any standards outside 
of Him; then, the worry is that morality would be arbitrary if God, an infinitely powerful Being, 
decided what good and bad are without having any bases of criterion. Euthyphro’s view is, in fact, 
that goodness and morality are dependent on God. Goodness is not an intrinsic value that a thing 
possesses, instead goodness is something which God bestows on a thing. So, for all X, X is good 
if and only if God bestows goodness on X. In this view, if a thing is good, it is because God 
bestowed the quality of goodness on the thing. The dialogue continues, and Socrates points to the 
circularity in Euthyphro’s reasoning:  
Socrates: But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious 
was being loved because it was pious, 11 the god-loved would also be being loved because it was 
god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the 
pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods. But now you see that they are 
in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is such as to be loved 
because it is being loved, the other is being loved because it is such as to be loved. I’m afraid, 
Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to 
me, but you told me an affect or a quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all 
the b gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is. Plato, Five Dialogues, Euthyphro (11b) 
 
There is a worry that is present in Euthyphro’s account: if goodness and morality are 
decided by God, then based on what standard, or criteria, does God decide what is good? In other 
words, suppose God decides to bestow the quality of goodness on Q, on what basis did God decide 
to bestow goodness on Q, instead of P for example? If God decides that Q is good, then He either 
                                                        
76 Plato, Five Dialogues, Euthyphro (G. M. A Grube translation) 
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made the decision based on a standard, or He made the decision arbitrarily, not based on any 
standard. If we suppose that His decision is made arbitrarily, not based on any standard, then this 
would create two problems. 
The first problem is that if God decides, based on no standard, to bestow goodness on Q, 
and Q happens to be murder, so now murdering other people becomes something valuable, then 
the world would just turn into chaos. It would be very difficult for us to even imagine living in a 
world where people wake up every day with the belief that murder is good, or even acceptable. 
However, if God decides, based on no standard, to bestow goodness on Q, and Q happens to be 
loving one’s parents, then this would not cause any problems for us. But in this case, we revisit 
Nietzsche’s genealogical and psychological account: namely, what brought us to the belief that 
there is a transcendent being Whom the quality of goodness is dependent on? Additionally, why 
would we need God if His decision that Q is good is based on no standard? If the decision is based 
on no standard, then we ourselves can figure out what is good from bad. There is also the fact that 
it is hardly ever, perhaps never the case that someone truly believes in the Abrahamic God and is 
familiar with the teachings of the Abrahamic religions; but still believes that God decides goodness 
and badness in an arbitrary and not in a wise manner. 
The second and more serious problem is that if God’s decision is not made arbitrarily, but 
instead is made based on a standard, then He either a) created the standard which he uses to decide 
what is good, or b) the standard already existed and God ‘consults’ the standard to make His 
decision. If a), then this would bring us back to the first problem; namely, on what basis (or 
standard) did God create the standard? If b), then it would seem that there is not a need for God; 
we ourselves could consult the standard and find out what is good and what is moral. 
Nietzsche rejects Socrates’ account and partially agrees with Euthyphro’s. Like Euthyphro, 
he rejects the notion that goodness is something that a thing possesses intrinsically: “Whatever has 
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value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always 
value-less.” Instead, whatever has value “has been given value at some time, as a present.” 77 This 
view is similar to Euthyphro’s in the sense that nothing is valuable in-itself, but it is not God who 
gives value, or bestows goodness, instead, “it was we who gave and bestowed it. Only we have 
created the world that concerns man!” 78 So, for all X, X does not have value in itself until someone 
assigns value to it. In other words, things become, or things are good because someone assigned 
value to them. In this way, Nietzsche’s position is not challenged by the Euthyphro dilemma. The 
dilemma is worrisome when the two choices are either goodness is something which a thing 
possess intrinsically, or goodness is something which God bestows on a thing, but so far, 
Nietzsche’s position is neither of the two.79 
 
Objective Moral Facts – J.L. Mackie 
 
Even that sense of truth, which is at bottom merely the sense of security, is possessed by man in 
common with the animals: we do not wish to be deceived by others or by ourselves; we hear with 
some suspicion the promptings of our own passions, we control ourselves and remain on the watch 
against ourselves. Now, the animal does all this as well as man …  In the same way, the animal 
observes the effects it exercises on the imagination of other beasts: it thus learns to view itself from 
their position, to consider itself “objectively”. Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, I 26 
 
In my reading of the various interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, I found that 
claims about “Truth” are where most disagreements on his interpretation occur. Among the current 
prominent scholars of Nietzsche, I find Brian Leiter, and Ken Gemes’ interpretation to be the most 
plausible for they make the best case, the most reasonable interpretations, and they are the most 
widely recognizable academically. Often, the interpretations which claim that Nietzsche 
completely rejects truth refer to passages or quotes that are taken out of context. For instance, in 
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greatness.” (Morality Critics, pp. 1047) This will be discussed in later sections. 
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his (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887) Notebooks in an essay titled On Truth and Lie I an Extra-Moral 
Sense, Nietzsche wrote “it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations. . . .” However, 
this is a prime example of taking Nietzsche out of context. This quote, if taken at face value, would 
mean that Nietzsche completely rejects truth; but that is not the case: Brian Leiter writes that 
“[Nietzsche does not claim] that there are no truths or facts about anything, let alone truths about 
value – a reading which has now been widely discredited. There is, on the skeptical view at issue 
here, a special problem about the objectivity of value.” 80  What Nietzsche rejects—quite 
consistently with his moral anti-realist view—is the claim that there are objective moral values.81 
The philosopher J.L. Mackie shares a similar view with Nietzsche: namely, both are moral anti-
realists. Their rejection is simply against the claim that there are objective moral values. For 
Mackie, there are two claims he provides to argue against objective moral values. He provides a 
conceptual claim and a metaphysical claim. 
On the metaphysical claim, Mackie argues that the mistake people, make when they make 
moral judgements, is the assumption that their judgements correspond to objective values (i.e., 
objective moral facts). He believes that all claims about objective morality are false. The claim is 
that we believe that we act in accordance to an objective moral code; but in actuality, we do not 
because in the real world, objective moral facts and duties do not exist. Supposing that his 
argument is sound, it would mean that our belief does not correspond to anything objective. He 
believes that there is an error in our thinking when we make a moral judgement about what is 
moral and what is immoral. These judgements, according to Mackie, do not seem to correspond to 
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any facts in the real world since facts that do exist in the real world can be examined empirically, 
but facts about morality cannot be examined empirically the way natural facts can be. 
Through observation and empirical examination, testing and verifying, we were able to 
discover and prove that, for example, the laws of physics exist. In the event that a person doubts 
the existence of a law of physics, we are able to prove to them and demonstrate, through the 
scientific method, that it does exist. If an objective moral code exists in the same way the laws of 
physics exist, then we should be able to apply some method of testing, some method of verifying. 
We might say that objective moral values exist, but it is not fair to compare them to the laws of 
physics. The two are different, and so a comparison is not a fair way to judge whether objective 
moral values exist or not. Mackie would ask, what are they and how do we know them? They seem 
to be strange in comparison to everything else we know. This strangeness of moral values is what 
Mackie calls the “The argument from queerness”: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of 
them, it would have to be by some special faculty or moral perception or intuition, utterly different 
from our ordinary ways of knowing everything. J.L. Mackie, On The Subjectivity of Values, 9  
 
Nietzsche too took morals to be something queer – it seems that we are unable to treat them in the 
same way we treat other things: “All moral acts are in reality “something different,”—we cannot 
say anything more about them, and all acts are essentially unknown to us.”82 The common belief, 
however, does not raise these suspicions; they take moral realism at face value: 
The general belief, however, has been and still is quite the contrary: the most ancient realism is 
against us: up to the present humanity has thought, “An action is what it appears to be.” 
[Schopenhauer], too … continued to adhere to this moral realism: “Each one of us is in reality a 
competent and perfect moral judge, knowing exactly good and evil, made holy by loving good and 
despising evil,—such is every one of us in so far as the acts of others and not his own are under 
consideration, and when he has merely to approve or disapprove, whilst the burden of the 
performance of the acts is borne by other shoulders. Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, I 116 
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On the conceptual claim, Mackie argues that for moral values to be objective, they have to be 
intrinsically motivating. He argues that for an action to be objectively bad, it would have an 
intrinsic “not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it.”83 When we discuss a moral fact, our concept 
of them is that of a categorical imperative which are, on the normative side, independent of any 
person’s contingent desires. For instance, “one ought not to harm others for pleasure” is a claim 
which has a categorical imperative built into it independent of anyone’s contingent desires (i.e., an 
intrinsic reason to not harm others for pleasure). In other words, they would have to have a 
categorical imperative somehow built into them.84 My reconstruction of the argument from The 
Subjectivity of Values, is the following: 
1. Things are either categorically imperative (e.g., desires such as thirst and hunger) or 
not categorically imperative (e.g., laws of nature and physics). 
2. Things that are independent from us are not categorically imperative. 
3. Things that are independent from us are objective. 
4. There is nothing that is independent from us that is also categorically imperative. 
5. From 2, 3 and 4, objective things are not categorically imperative. 
6. If morality is objective, then from 5, it follows that morality is not categorically 
imperative (i.e., “not-to-be-doneness” is not built into it). 
7. Morality is categorically imperative. ∴  From 6 and 7, morality is not objective. 
 
If Mackie thinks that objective moral values are “queer,” in comparison to “our ordinary ways of 
knowing,” then where does he think they came from? In The Miracle of Theism, Mackie imports 
the argument from queerness to argue that moral objectivity rests more on the assumption that an 
omniscient God exists than on any other metaphysical assumptions: 
Objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a 
cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of 
events, without an all-powerful god to create them. If, then, there are such intrinsically prescriptive 
objective values, they make the existence of a god more probable than it would have been without 
them. Thus, we have, after all, a defensible inductive argument from morality to the existence of a 
god. J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 155 
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We have “a defensible argument from morality to the existence of God” because if morality were 
objective, then there needs to be a powerful being who could manage its enforcement, and because 
it is strange for “natural features [to] simply do in themselves constitutes reasons for or against the 
action that involve them.” If that were the case; then objectivism would be a “doctrine that an 
action’s being of a certain naturally identifiable kind may in itself be a reason for doing it or for 
not doing it.” In other words, it would need to be true “that there may be a fact of a peculiarly 
moral kind.”85 But, according to Mackie: 
This is a mere reformulation, which leaves the substance of the problem unchanged. It will then be 
this alleged moral fact itself that is the initially puzzling item, which the existence of a god may be 
postulated to explain. J.L Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 116 
 
Towards the end of The Subjectivity of Values, Mackie surmises a few possible origins of the belief 
in objective morality, one of which is Christianity. Both Nietzsche and Mackie are doubtless that 
(at least) some modern Western moral beliefs (despite claims of secularity)  are “traceable to the 
theological ethics of Christianity.” Mackie appeals to the “stress on quasi-imperative notions on 
what ought to be done or on what is wrong in a sense that is close to that of ‘forbidden’ surely 
relics of divine commands.” Similarly, Nietzsche (by analyzing genealogically) argues in a section 
titled To The Admirers of Objectiveness in The Dawn of Day that children observe in the people 
whom they grew up around “certain varied and strong feelings, with but little subtle discernment 
and inclination for intellectual justice and has therefore employed his best powers and his most 
precious time in imitating these feelings … Under the domination of this experience, which he is 
powerless to shake off, he admires neutrality of feeling or “objectivity” … and he cannot believe 
that even this neutrality is merely the product of education and habit.”86 
In this case, Mackie’s argument is strongly related to Nietzsche’s position: both argue that 
the belief in objective morality is likely the product of (or at least has been influenced by) the 
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assumption that an omniscient and omnibenevolent God exists. This shows striking resemblance 
to the slaves in slave morality and their desire for equality. The slaves claimed that their God-given 
morality is the right one, and they desire to generalize it to everyone unconditionally. 
 
The Christianity of Modern Secular Morality 
 
Essentially, the primary concern for Nietzsche is when a given set of values or a system of 
morality becomes a threat on human greatness and human excellence. 87  For example, 
contemporary moral philosophers, such as Peter Singer, “treat everyone’s sentience and suffering 
as of decisive moral importance, aligning themselves firmly with the egalitarian moral thinking 
central to Christianity.”88 It comes as no surprise that “a popular conceit in recent Anglophone 
philosophy, familiar from the writings of Derek Parfit and Peter Singer in particular, is that until 
philosophical ethics frees itself from “religion,” it will not be able to make progress.”89 They “think 
of themselves as vanguards in this movement, a claim rich in irony for any student of Nietzsche.”90 
Leiter is alluding to the fact that considering everyone’s suffering “as of decisive 
importance” is fundamentally “Christian to its core, as any Nietzschean would notice.”91 It is 
Christian because Christianity, according to Nietzsche, has made the abolition of suffering a top 
priority. For Nietzsche however, “one must desire both [pleasure and pain] if one is to achieve 
anything.”92 Nietzsche associates the need to maximize pleasure and minimize pain as being 
common in “metaphysicians and religious people.” It comes as no surprise that one might object 
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to Leiter by arguing that Singer, for example, is as far as he could be from being a religious person. 
Leiter is not asserting that Singer is a Christian, but that the morality which he promotes is, as 
Leiter puts it, “Christian to the core.” Nietzsche believes that “even morality is so important to 
them because they see in it an essential condition for the abolition of suffering.”93 The tendency to 
regard religion as bearing no relevance on moral theories, and to think of one’s moral philosophy—
especially if it is a morality of utility—as something which religion stands in the way of, is not 
anything new. Back in the 19th century, Nietzsche witnessed a similar sentiment by English moral 
philosophers:  
When the English really believe that they 'intuitively' know all by themselves what is good and 
what is evil; and when, as a result, they think that they do not need Christianity to guarantee 
morality any more, this is itself just the result of the domination of the Christian value judgment 
and an expression of the strength and depth of this domination. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, IX 
5 
 
In this way, Nietzsche considers a morality that rests on promoting utility; generalizes itself 
unconditionally (i.e., claims of objectivity); and places the abolition of suffering at the top of its 
hierarchy, as a derivative of Christian morality. This does not mean that Nietzsche denies that an 
immoral action should be avoided, and a moral action encouraged. What he denies is the claim 
that moral judgements are founded on truths. He writes, “I deny morality in the same way I deny 
alchemy, i.e. I deny its hypothesis … I also deny immorality—not that innumerable people feel 
immoral, but that there is any true reason why they should feel so.” So, Nietzsche here is not 
arguing that when an action is thought of as ‘immoral,’ it actually is not immoral; instead, his 
concern is specifically on the notion that there is a “true” reason why we should feel that it is 
immoral.  
 
Creation of Values – Nietzschean Dialogue 
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We have argued that Nietzsche’s goal is to critique morality and to engage in a revaluation 
of values. It is, however, not a simple task since it is unclear how one should revaluate one’s values. 
For instance, at times, Nietzsche seems to be gravitating towards master morality and the noble 
aristocratic way of living. In other times, he seems to be arguing for a revaluation that leads to 
entirely new values, radically different from slave and Christian morality. In order to determine 
which is the right way, we must first understand what a moral action for Nietzsche is. Up till now, 
we have discussed Nietzsche’s critique of various moralities and his rejection of objective morality 
and moral values being intrinsically valuable. What then does Nietzsche take to be a moral action? 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche provides a Socratic dialect between himself and another person on 
what constitutes a moral action. The other person provides a definition of what he takes to be a 
moral action: 
When a human being judges ‘this is right’ and then infers ‘therefore it must be done,’ and then 
proceeds to do what he has thus recognized as right and designated as necessary—then the essence 




When you judge “this is right,” that is an action, too. Might it not be possible that one could judge 
in a moral and in an immoral manner?95 
 
The other person responds: 
 
Because this is what my conscience tells me: and the voice of conscience is never immoral, for it 
alone determines what is to be moral.96 
 
Nietzsche is suspicious of people when they appeal to their conscience as an infallible judge on 
what is right and what is wrong. He replies: 
But why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? And what gives you the right to consider 
such a judgement true and infallible? For this faith—is there no conscience for that? … A 
conscience behind your conscience?97 
 
                                                        





Now Nietzsche tries to tell the other person that one’s beliefs of what is right and what is wrong 
are not simply the result of listening to one’s conscience and deciding ‘this is right’ and then 
inferring ‘therefore it must be done.’ Conscience is not a pure indicator of right and wrong; there 
are all kinds of factors that influence it. He writes: 
Your judgement “this is right” has a pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and 
lack of experiences. “How did it originate there?” you must ask, and then also: “What is it that 
impels me to listen to it?” You can listen to its commands like a good soldier who hears his officer’s 
commands … Or like a dunderhead who obeys because no objection occurs to him. In short, there 
are a hundred ways in which you can listen to your conscience. 98 
 
Nietzsche now makes his point that being suspicious of one’s conscience is necessary if one wants 
to know why one thinks a certain action is moral or immoral. The judgements we make that 
something is right or wrong are influenced by many factors including the fact that this is what we 
have been taught since childhood: 
But that you take this or that judgement for the voice of conscience—in other words, that you feel 
something to be right—may be due to the fact that you have never thought much about yourself 
and simply accepted blindly that what you had been told ever since your childhood was right.99 
 
Now Nietzsche tells the person how his understanding of what is moral would be “spoiled” once 
the person reflects more subtly and observes his thoughts better: 
If you had thought more subtly, observed better, and learned more … your understanding of the 
manner in which moral judgements have originated would spoil these grands for you.100 
 
The person tells Nietzsche that Kant’s categorical imperative would be a solution to this problem. 
Since conscience is not always reliable, then abiding by a categorical imperative would not put us 
in the risk of letting our conscience be the only method of judging. After all, the categorical 
imperative tells us that we must always follow an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional 
principle despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary.101 Nietzsche 
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rejects the categorical imperative: he asserts that it is selfish to judge based on a categorical 
imperative. He writes, 
What? You admire the categorical imperative within you? The “firmness” of your so-called moral 
judgement? This “unconditional” feeling that “here everyone must judge as I do?102 
 
Now Nietzsche provides another reason of why he rejects the categorical imperative. He tells the 
person that by following the categorical imperative, he is not discovering himself nor creating his 
own ideal: 
It is selfish to experience one’s own judgement as a universal law; and this selfishness is blind, 
petty, and frugal because it betrays that you have not yet discovered yourself nor created for 
yourself an ideal of your own, your very own.103 
 
Here, there seems to be a tension between rejecting the categorical imperative because it is selfish; 
yet saying that one should create an ideal of one’s very own. However, the selfishness here, which 
Nietzsche is referring to, lies in the fact that in the categorical imperative, we are supposed to act 
in accordance to a maxim where we will that it should become a universal law. In other words, I 
selfishly will that the absolute and unconditional maxim—which I believe should be obeyed—
should become a universal law which. One might be curious that if Nietzsche rejects all of these 
ways of deciding what is moral, then does this imply that he has not any notion of which actions 
should be avoided, and which ones should be encouraged? In the previous section, I have argued 
that Nietzsche rejects the idea that moral judgements are founded on truth. However, Nietzsche 
has more to say; he does in fact believe that some actions are to be avoided and some are to be 
encouraged. However, it is not because he judges them to be moral or immoral: 
 I should not, of course, deny—unless I were a fool—that many actions which are called immoral 
should be avoided and resisted; and in the same way that many which are called moral should be 
performed and encouraged; but I hold that in both cases these actions should be performed from 
motives other than those which have prevailed up to the present time. We must learn anew in order 
that at last, perhaps very late in the day, we may be able to do something more: feel anew. Nietzsche, 
The Dawn of Day, 103 
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What he rejects is specifically the motives of these actions up to his present time. In other words, 
he rejects the motive of action if it is based on an appeal to conscience, to a God, to a categorical 
imperative, and so on. The better way for Nietzsche is for us to reevaluate our own values based 
on our own judgement and criteria of what we consider good and bad: 
Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations and to the creation 
of our own new tables of what is good and let us stop brooding about the “moral value of our action”! 
We, [unlike the great majority], want to become those we are—human beings who are new … who 
give themselves laws, who create themselves.104 
 
Admittedly, Nietzsche does not leave us with much to work with. So far, he rejects a 
morality that is not based on one’s own conception of what is good, and he recommends that one 
creates his/her own morality. He casts a distinct suspicion on our “conscience” being a reliable 
measure of what is good and what is bad: other factors contribute to the way our conscience guides 
us. He does not provide a system of morality or a moral theory. Though he admires master morality 
to a certain extent, he considers it to be an early phase of history, where people respected their 
impulses, but have not yet developed the ability to take a stand on one’s impulses. He understands 
that there is no returning to it after the slave revolt in morality, which reaches its apex with 
Christianity. Moreover, the naiveté and lack of self-reflection of the original masters made them 
susceptible to their being overtaken by slave morality. Presently, in order for the modern human 
being to overcome itself, it must incorporate aspects of slave morality as well. 
It would seem contradictory for Nietzsche to tell us we should reevaluate our own values 
and also provide us the values that we should adapt. If this is the case, then we are not really 
creating our own values; we are only adapting his values. However, in The Will to Power, 
Nietzsche explains why it matters that the individual derives values of his act from himself. Even 
if he does not “create a formula” he is still creative: 
Ultimately, the individual derives the values of his acts from himself; because he has to interpret in 
a quite individual way even the words he has inherited. His interpretation of a formula at least is 
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personal, even if he does not create a formula: as an interpreter he is still creative. Nietzsche, The 
Will to Power 767 
 
Ken Gemes argues that what Nietzsche is concerned about is “cultivating the plant 
man”: ”A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work as a breeding agent”105 Although the picture 
of what Nietzsche values is not clear, he clearly “values the cultivating of great individual and how 
is one to become one.” Nevertheless, he repeatedly claims that his words are only for selected ears. 
The work of Nietzsche, according to Gemes, “was intended as a tool for liberation. As for the 
liberated it is up to them to create their own individuality.” This is stated most clearly in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra: “This—is now my way: where is yours?”106 So far, we have established that 
Nietzsche rejects certain values and moralities and encourages the individual to create their own 
values. While he does not provide a way, a moral theory, or any kind of system, he most certainly 
regards the will to power as an essential driving force for one to create their own values and become 
who one is. 
Characteristics of Higher Humans 
 
 In the previous section, we have argued that Nietzsche does not provide a way or any moral 
theory or a system of values; instead it is the person who should create their own values. We have 
also argued, in previous sections, that Nietzsche’s critique of morality and call for individuals to 
create their values, are motivated by his concern that herd morality is not suitable for great human 
beings. The best we can take from Nietzsche’s critique of morality is not to try and construct an 
entirely new system of values, radically different from the present one; instead, we should note 
what characteristics, what qualities does he see as necessary for human excellence. All throughout 
Nietzsche’s work, he discusses many characteristics which he considers as distinctive of higher 
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humans. I have found four characteristics that are mentioned  the most: namely, solitude, the 
seeking of heavy responsibility, resilience, and life-affirmation. In this section, I will discuss each 
and provide necessary details.  
First, the higher human is solitary: “The concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting 
to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently.”107 
Solitude is an essential characteristic of the higher human, according to Nietzsche. A solitary 
individual “knows how to make enemies everywhere,” he “constantly contradicts the great 
majority not through words but through deeds.”108 In Ecce Homo, he discusses his own biography 
and how solitude played a role in his own life. He writes, “You cannot have any nerves ... Even 
suffering from solitude is an objection, – I have only ever suffered from multitudes.”109 It is not an 
easy state to be in; Nietzsche believed that not everyone is brave enough for solitude. It forces a 
person to confront his own thoughts, as Andre Gide wrote, “The fear of finding oneself alone—
that is what they suffer from—and so they don’t find themselves at all.”110 After all, human beings 
are social creatures, so being able to handle solitude is not something that we are born with. It 
requires one to be brave enough, to enter territories he is not accustomed to. One of the benefits of 
solitude is that it frees one from being constantly influenced, both consciously and unconsciously, 
by the herd. Once one appreciates and desires solitude, one places oneself in a good position where 
one can self-critique and evaluate one’s impulses and desires.111 
Secondly, the higher human “instinctively seeks heavy responsibilities.”112 He does not 
seek responsibility in an arbitrary manner; instead, he demonstrates “a long logic in all of his 
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activates, hard to survey because of its length.” The responsibility he adapts is based on a 
meaningful goal he is pursing.113 A higher human who is exemplary when it comes to bearing 
responsibility, according to Nietzsche, is Napoleon: 
With natures like … Napoleon, one gets some notion of "disinterested" work on their marble, 
whatever the cost in men. On this road lies the future of the highest men: to bear the greatest 
responsibility and not collapse under it.- Hitherto, the delusions of inspiration were almost always 
needed in order not to lose one's faith in one's right and one's hand. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 
975 
 
Responsibility is a great manifestation of how one’s will to power can be sublimated: sublimation 
in the sense of being autonomous, being in control of one’s actions and impulses, not suppressing 
one’s impulses and desires, but being in control of them – it can be thought of as an example of 
extreme ownership of one’s decisions and outcomes. One can argue that it seems a little 
contradictory for Nietzsche to praise responsibility, and yet, as I have discussed in the deed vs. 
doer section, reject the notion of free will as a phenomenon where an agent consciously wills to 
take an action. However, Nietzsche is not against making a separation between doer and deed; 
instead, he is against the idea that a doer has the libertarian ability to do otherwise. When he 
discusses responsibility, he argues for responsibility as a part of one’s will to power. Although a 
human being possesses various and competing instincts, such instincts are all part of the will to 
power, the most fundamental instincts: “The instincts for freedom (in my language: the will to 
power); only here the material upon which forgiving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself 
is man himself.”114 
 Thirdly, the higher human is mentally resilient, he is able to withstand difficult conditions 
and find pleasure in his unescapable suffering, “he guesses what remedies avail against what is 
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harmful.”115 This is best exemplified in Nietzsche’s discussion of his own life. He writes about 
how much he has endured pain in his life, yet he never felt that his suffering is evil. In fact, quite 
the opposite: 
[Sickness] can be an energetic stimulus to life ... This is, in fact, how that long period of illness 
looks to me now: I discovered life anew ... myself included, I tasted all good and even small things 
in ways that other people cannot easily do ... [Indeed,] the years of my lowest vitality were the ones 
when I stopped being a pessimist. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo I 2  
 
Nietzsche had been ill his whole life; he lived in solitude and moved to a new place every few 
months. At the age of 44, after allegedly witnessing a horse being whipped in the Italian city of 
Turin, Nietzsche had a mental breakdown which he never recovered from. It is reported that when 
Nietzsche saw the horse being whipped; he clung tightly to the neck of the horse, wailing and 
refusing to let it go. Prior to his unrecoverable mental breakdown, his books could not find 
publishers who were willing to publish them, so Nietzsche had to borrow money from family and 
friends in order to have them published.116 Yet, despite all of this, he had an astonishingly powerful 
and positive approach to life. In the first section, The Will to Power, I argued that for Nietzsche, 
pleasure is not something which a person should aim at, instead pleasure lies precisely “in the fact 
that the will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance.” In this way, Nietzsche’s 
sublimation of his will to power to become more resilient made him find pleasure in his illness and 
physical suffering. Why did Nietzsche find pleasure in his suffering? Simply because he pursued 
what he found meaningful. Suffering itself is not the problem, it is the absence of a goal or a 
meaning in one’s life that makes the suffering a problem. In The Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche 
writes that: 
“Man, the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does not deny suffering as such: he wills it, he 
even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering. The 
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116 After his breakdown, it is reported that Nietzsche never spoke a word again. It is known that he ended up living 
with his sister in her house for the rest of his life. It is also reported that Nietzsche’s breakdown was caused by 
syphilis. 
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meaninglessness of suffering, not the suffering, was the curse that has so far blanketed mankind.” 
Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, III 28 
 
On the contrary, Nietzsche saw displeasure and suffering as a price that must be paid for his growth 
and abundance. 
 Forth, the higher human is life-affirming. He affirms life with all of its joy and suffering. 
He would gladly will the repetition of his life, with its good and bad, through eternity. The clearest 
conception Nietzsche has for life-affirmation is what he comes to call amor fati: “My formula for 
human greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different, not forward, not 
backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it … but to love 
it.”117 And in The Will to Power he writes:  
“it is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, instinctive good 
health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love … and if one is not 
firm and brave within oneself, one has nothing to bestow and cannot stretch out one's hand to 
protect and support.” Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 338 
 
Nietzsche sees life-affirmation best exemplified in Nietzsche’s favorite Greek God, Dionysian: 
“The world “Dionysian” means: an urge to unity … an ecstatic affirmation of the total character 
of life as that which remains the same … and calls good even the most terrible and most 
questionable qualities of life.”118 In the following passage from The Will to Power, Nietzsche 
connects amor fati, Dionysian, and life-affirmation in one passage: 
“My new path to a “Yes” … such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally 
even the possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it must halt at 
a negation, a No, a will to negation. It wants rather to cross over to the opposite of this—to a 
Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection—it wants 
the eternal circulation: —the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The highest 
state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for 
this is amor fati." Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1041 
 
Although it may be inconsistent that we should “not want anything to be different”; yet Nietzsche 
also proposed that we need to be more autonomous and we need to reevaluate our values. I take 
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this not to mean that we should not want anything to be different in the sense that we should not 
try to change anything in our lives; but instead, as an approach to life where we try our best to 
reevaluate our own values, be solitary, adapt responsibility, affirm our lives; and if we end up in 
an undesirable place in life, a place we did not anticipate—such as a chronic illness in the case of 
Nietzsche—then we should not want anything to have been different, because we tried our best 
with great effort, we lived a brave life; therefore, we should not feel bad for circumstances that are 
out of our control. Therefore, simply: we need to work hard in order to be in control of ourselves 
physically and mentally; and especially on our conscience since it influences our decisions of what 
is right and what is wrong. 
Conclusion – Our Conscience 
 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche discusses how we need to develop an ability to control our 
conscience, which helps us to notice our drives and impulses, and make sure that when we critique 
and manage them, we are not turning an evil eye towards them, as that would be a kind of self-
hatred. Conscience, Nietzsche writes, “is not, as people may believe, ‘the voice of God in man’: it 
is the instinct of cruelty that turns back after it can no longer discharge itself externally.” One way 
to interpret Nietzsche’s thought here is to say that human beings simply desire to undergo suffering. 
Another interpretation is to say that human beings find pleasure in inflicting suffering on 
themselves. According to Christopher Janaway, Nietzsche is arguing the latter: we are gratified 
not as recipients, but as agents of suffering. For example, in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche 
writes that “anyone who despises himself will still respect himself as a despiser.”119 Christopher 
Janaway argues that “being despised is unpleasant and distressing, and being despised by oneself 
instead of by another presumably does not alter that fact; but in so far as one identifies with the 
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subject of the despising relation, to some extent split off from oneself as its object, one can stand 
in a positive affective attitude to oneself, that of respecting.”120 There are two central thoughts 
regarding Janaway’s interpretation and Nietzsche’s idea about cruelty and its turning back against 
the self. First, human beings have an instinctive drive from which they tend to gain pleasure from 
inflicting suffering.121 Second, when human beings are prevented from discharging their impulses 
and instinctive drives outwardly, they discharge them inwardly. Because of these two, it may be 
best if we try to gain more self-knowledge so that we have a better understanding of our impulses 
and drives and prioritize some of them to win over others. 
When we have a better understanding of our impulses and drives, and that some of our 
drives are competing with each other, we can recognize the ones that we closely identify with. We 
can let some of our competing impulses win out and not others, and we can become better at 
restraining the ones that we do not identify with. In order to accomplish this type of inner 
psychological analysis and evaluation, we need a great of deal of self-knowledge which we can 
attain by following Nietzsche’s idea of the higher man: namely, being solitary, responsible, 
resilient, and life-affirming. We may be in a situation where we are not able to be in a state of 
solitude—e.g., having to take care of dependents, such as family members, for instance—in which 
case, we may choose to be more responsible in helping, more resilient against the difficulties we 
face, and more accepting of circumstances that are out of our control. We can try to adapt and 
strengthen all of the four characteristics I listed, and if we are not able to adapt all of them due to 
circumstances that are out of our control; then we can do our best to identify the ones which we 
are able to adapt, and work on strengthening them. 
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